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Of Levinas and Shakespeare:  
“To See Another Thus”
“Together, the papers in this marvelous collection reveal the significance of 
Shakespeare for Levinas and the significance of Levinas for Shakespeare. 
At a time of keen interest in Shakespeare and philosophy, it will be wel-
comed by philosophers and literary critics alike.”
–Andrew Cutrofello, Professor of Philosophy, 
Loyola University Chicago
“Coming upon the heels of the four-hundred-year anniversary of Shake-
speare’s death, Of Levinas and Shakespeare offers a timely and ambitious 
addition to the growing body of work on Levinas as a writer in peculiar 
and often uncanny proximity to other writers. This collection explores 
the nuanced play of affinities between 20th-century ethical  philosopher 
and Elizabethan dramatist/poet, and discloses ways in which Shakespeare 
might be used to open up Levinas and not merely the other (and more 
predictable) way around. If reading can be a way of inhabiting, a form 
of living space, then this volume offers ample satisfaction for the room it 
provides a range of audiences—scholars of Levinas and of Shakespeare, 
students of ethical criticism, dialogists of literature and philosophy—to 
dwell for a time ‘within.’”
–Adam Z. Newton, University Professor Emeritus, 
Yeshiva University
“This valuable collection of essays responds to an observation Levinas made 
after the War—to wit, that ‘the whole of philosophy is only a meditation 
on Shakespeare.’ With this pithy remark, Levinas opened the work of the 
great bard to our contemporary condition, as a profoundly self-reflexive, 
indeed ethical, thinker. Through sustained cross-readings of Levinas and 
Shakespeare, the essays take up dwelling in the tragedies and comedies 
of Shakespeare, situating the ongoing renewal of the letter through new 
insights. What are these revitalizing insights into Shakespeare of which 
Levinas speaks? Above all, it is discerning, in the situations and characters 
of the playwright, a testimony to the human encounter as infinite, as unlim-
ited by concepts and the ongoing drive to unfold a story and to interrupt 
it, holding it far from simple answers. Understood through Levinas’s eyes, 
Shakespeare dramatized what the philosopher recognized as human worlds 
peopled with figures, great and small, who are compelled by their respec-
tive others to respond and to seek justice. Students and teachers alike will 
find in this collection innovative and thought-provoking avenues toward 
reframing Shakespeare studies, and impressive stagings and illustrations 
of Levinas’s challenging thought.”
–Bettina Bergo, Professor of Philosophy, 
Université de Montréal
“These essays do not simply apply Levinasian concepts to Shakespeare, 
which in Levinas’s terms would do violence to Shakespeare by bounding 
his work with a conceptual schema. Instead, these astute and sympathetic 
readings enable the Shakespearean literary world, which (as Hamlet sug-
gests to Horatio) overflows the boundaries of philosophy’s dream, to speak 
and listen to Levinas’s philosophical world, which overflows the boundaries 
of the concept by rooting thought in ethics. This dialogue works hard to 
preserve the concrete humanity and ethical grounding of both worlds. 
Now more than ever, in an era that permits the reduction of the human 
to the tweet, we need this kind of reading.”
–David P. Haney, President, Centenary University
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“I should ev’n die with pity,
To see another thus. I know not what to say.”
—Lear in Shakespeare’s
 
King Lear (IV.vii. 52-53),
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Foreword
Andrew Cutrofello
The great Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi famously wondered whether 
he was a man who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly 
dreaming he was a man. It is helpful to remember this anecdote 
when thinking about Levinas’s suggestion that “the whole of philos-
ophy is only a meditation of Shakespeare.” As several contributors to 
this volume point out, the genitive “of” (de in French) is ambiguous: 
was Levinas saying that philosophy is a meditation on Shakespeare, 
or that philosophy is a meditation by Shakespeare? Perhaps, like 
Zhuangzi, he was wondering whether he was a philosopher dreaming 
he was Shakespeare, or Shakespeare dreaming he was a philosopher.
Like so many philosophers, Levinas was fascinated by Shake-
speare. One passage that especially fascinated him was the remark 
that Banquo makes immediately after the witches vanish in Act 1, 
scene 3 of Macbeth: “The earth hath bubbles, as the water has, / And 
these are of them.” (1.3.79-80) As Hilaire Kallendorf and Claire Katz 
point out in their essay, Levinas cites these words several times over 
the course of his career. In 1947 he compares being’s insinuation in 
nothingness to “bubbles of the earth” (les bulles de terre) (Existence 
and Existents, 57), and in 1965 he uses the same phrase to describe 
the insinuation of the face into being. (“Phenomenon and Enigma,” 
in Collected Philosophical Papers, 70) Finally, in a Talmudic reading 
published in 1977, he characterizes the sacred (le sacré) as “bubbles 
of Nothing in things.” (Nine Talmudic Readings, 141)
What exactly are these bubbles of the earth, and how can they 
signify so many different things for Levinas? Let us briefly examine 
the series:
(1) insinuation of being in nothing
(2) insinuation of the face in being
(3) insinuation of nothing in being
At first glance, (1) and (3) appear to be diametrically opposed. 
According to (1), Banquo’s bubbles are bubbles of being: like the 
spawn of a spontaneous generation, they literally appear out of 
nowhere. According to (3), however, the bubbles are bubbles of 
nothing that flicker in and out of being. Perhaps we can resolve 
this apparent contradiction by considering Banquo’s comparison of 
bubbles of the earth to bubbles of the water. Bubbles of the water 
are made not of water but of air. Of what are bubbles of the earth 
made? Being? Nothing? Or something else?
Perhaps the correct answer is fire. This would be in keeping with 
the witches’ chant, “Double, double, toil and trouble; / Fire burn 
and cauldron bubble.” (4.1.10-11) It would also round out the series 
of metaphysical elements:
(bubbles of the) water: air
(bubbles of the) earth: fire
For Heraclitus, fire was the most basic of the four elements. Fire 
was also a symbol or principle of becoming. Bubbles made of fire 
would be in a state of perpetual becoming. As such, they would 
involve both the insinuation of being in nothing and the insinuation 
of nothing in being. Far from contradicting each other, senses (1) 
and (3) would coincide.
Another way to explain the connection between senses (1) and (3) 
has to do with sense (2)—the radically different notion that Banquo’s 
bubbles involve the insinuation of the face in being. Beyond the 
ontological categories of being, nothing, and becoming, a face signi-
fies the transcendence of the good. Its appearance within being—its 
transcendence within immanence—is essentially evanescent. It is, 
as Levinas says, “immediately reduced to nothing, breaking up like 
the ‘bubbles of the earth.’” (“Phenomenon and Enigma,” 70)
These bubbles are not made of fire. They are made of words. 
They say something, though what they say is immediately dispersed, 
leaving behind the residue of something said. Understood this way, 
the sense of Banquo’s bubbles differs markedly from sense (3), the 
insinuation of nothing in being in the experience of the sacred. For 
Levinas, sacredness is fake transcendence. It is the sheen of the 
nothing that is the “obverse” of being: bubbles signifying nothing.
Bubbles of the sacred are made of fire. If they represent the 
insinuation of nothing in being, they can just as easily represent the 
insinuation of being in nothing. Once again, the difference between 
sense (1) and sense (3) turns out to be unimportant. This is con-
firmed by a passage from Levinas’s Prison Notebooks in which he 
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remarks that Hamlet “suffers from the insinuation of nothingness 
within being or of being within nothingness.” (Carnets de captiv-
ité, 174) The word “or” (ou) suggests that the two alternatives are 
fundamentally interchangeable.
Had the poet Paul Celan translated Macbeth into German, as he 
did twenty-one of Shakespeare’s sonnets, he might have forged one 
of his characteristic compounds to render “The earth hath bubbles” 
as Es gibt Erdblasen: “There are earthbubbles.” In French this could 
be translated as Il y a des bulles-terrestres. As Peter Szondi points 
out, Celan’s composite words are generally ambiguous. (Celan Stud-
ies, 66) They are “equivocators” that “palter with us in a double 
sense.” (Macbeth, 5.8.20) This is true of “earthbubbles.”
On the one hand, the statement Il y a des bulles-terrestres names 
the condition of the il y a: the inescapability of existence, whether 
understood as the insinuation of being in nothing or the insinuation 
of nothing in being. On the other hand, Il y a des bulles-terrestres 
signifies signification: the opposite (or other) of a “tale / Told by 
an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing.” (5.5.26-28) 
Banquo’s remark, “The earth hath bubbles, as the water has,” hovers 
between these two senses.
Earthbubbles of various sorts abound in Of Levinas and Shake-
speare: “To See Another Thus.” In his inaugural essay, Richard 
Cohen notes that while other Shakespeare scholars have called 
attention to the “reality of Shakespeare’s world,” Levinas reveals 
“the even deeper link that binds the true to the good.” As several 
other contributors point out, this link is indirectly indicated by the 
way it goes missing in King Lear, the play from which this volume 
draws its subtitle.
For Sandor Goodhart, Lear is an old man suffering from hyster-
ica passio, the “mother” swelling up toward his heart. Instead of 
welcoming the “gestation of the other” in himself, Lear protects 
himself from it, insisting that he is a man more sinned against than 
sinning. Ann Astell takes Lear to decline from an “unwise Solomon” 
to “another Job.” She distinguishes the play’s horizontal axis of nar-
cissistic rivalry from its vertical axis of ethical transcendence. The 
two axes converge in the character of Edgar, the unaccommodated 
man whose exposure on the heath awakens Lear’s pity. For Kent 
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Lehnhof, Cordelia signifies ethical transcendence by “disincarnating” 
God: her acts are “holy” (saint) rather than sacred.
Just as Astell discerns two axes in Lear, so Geoffrey Baker distin-
guishes two trajectories in The Merchant of Venice: Exilic wandering 
and Odyssean circulation. Yet just as Goodhart shows that for Levi-
nas the Exilic journey from self to other allows for a return to 
an expanded sense of self as being-for-another, so Baker explains 
how Shakespeare’s play calls into question conventional opposi-
tions between Jews and Greeks, Jews and Christians, exchange and 
gift-giving, law and mercy.
Kallendorf and Katz, in addition to tracking Levinas’s earthbubbles, 
read the knocking at the gate in Macbeth as “an allegory of the Oth-
er’s demand for recognition.” Thomas de Quincey famously argued 
that the knocking signifies the retreat of horror (“On the Knocking 
at the Gate in Macbeth,” The London Magazine,  October  1823), 
but for Kallendorf and Katz it anticipates the call, expressed by 
 Macduff, to “countenance” horror. Something similar could be said 
of the knocking in the final scene of Othello: Emilia’s cry at the 
door, “My lord, my lord! (5.2.84) signifies the entrance of the third 
party and the demand for justice.
Steven Shankman also deals with the passage from horror to 
responsibility, not least in his reference to Franz Rosenzweig’s invo-
cation of the “‘word and fire’ of the celestial Chariot of Ezekiel’s 
vision.” (Here word and fire both belong to the order of signification.) 
Shankman shows that Levinas’s distinction between the “superflux-
ion of the superfluous” (la superfluxion du superflu) and the giving of 
bread “taken out of one’s own mouth” derives from Lear’s awakening 
to the suffering of others (“Poor naked wretches. . .”). He concludes 
that Lear dies of the mother that eventually reaches his heart.
Turning from drama to narrative poetry, Sean Lawrence reads 
Venus and Adonis as a cautionary tale about the possessiveness of 
concupiscent love. Because her love is violent, Venus can neither 
convince Adonis to procreate nor transform his dead body into 
something immortal, as Ovid’s Venus does. In a similar vein, Don-
ald Wehrs shows how two of Shakespeare’s romances, Pericles and 
Cymbeline, distinguish types of affection whose difference had not 
been discernible in the world of Titus Andronicus. Tamora’s fierce 
love of kin reappears in Dionyza and the Queen, but it is contrasted 
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with the other-directed love of Marina and Imogen, the surrogate 
daughters they attempt to kill.
Tamora reappears in David Goldstein’s startling comparison 
between the cannibal meal in Titus and the plein air banquet in 
As You Like It. As he explains in lines that I cannot resist quoting: 
“both [plays] attempt to deal with the invented problem of the 
vagina dentata by structuring a meal to defuse the threat. The dif-
ference between the tragedy and the comedy isn’t the philosophical 
issues at stake, but rather the solutions to those issues. Cannibal 
banquet? No thanks, I’ll have the fruit cup. But I’ll eat it down 
here in my man cave.”
Goldstein is referring to Orlando, who eventually learns to eat 
civilly with both men and women. At the end of As You Like It, 
it is the melancholy Jaques who heads back to his (or rather the 
Duke’s) man cave. Moshe Gold compares Jaques’ speech about the 
Seven Ages of Man to a Mishnah in the Pirkei Avot about the stages 
of religious education. Gold finds that Jaques misses an opportu-
nity—both in the speech itself and in the blessings he offers each 
of the marrying couples—to teach his listeners how to learn from 
one another as they grow older together.
This observation is in keeping with Goldstein’s representation of 
Jaques as a Montaignean skeptic with a “darker purpose.” Unlike 
Levinas, for whom skepticism bespeaks inspiration, Jaques is a 
burster of bubbles. He is more inclined to scoff at the soldier 
“seeking the bubble reputation” (2.7.152) than he is to marvel at 
the equivocal words of three weird sisters. Levinas, like the child 
in Millais’ painting Bubbles, was a marveler. If it sometimes seems 
to me that his entire philosophy is a meditation—or dream—of 
earthbubbles, this is why.
Together, the papers in this marvelous collection reveal the signif-
icance of Shakespeare for Levinas and the significance of Levinas for 
Shakespeare. At a time of keen interest in Shakespeare and philos-
ophy, it will be welcomed by philosophers and literary critics alike.
Andrew Cutrofello  xv
Preface and Acknowledgments
Moshe Gold and Sandor Goodhart
Often a collection of essays by seasoned scholars gathered around 
the work of two important writers from different times and places 
constitutes a value of its own. Its assembly is designed to explore 
whatever interesting consequences and new insights may be gar-
nered from examining their writing in this uncommon conjunction. 
And in this case, the bare fact that at the moment of our proposal to 
Purdue University Press (that we might produce a book on Levinas 
and Shakespeare) there were more than seventy-nine book-length 
publications already available with phrases like “Levinas and” in the 
title or subtitle but not a single tome linking Levinas to Shakespeare 
is probably reason enough for a collection of this kind.
But the importance of this volume for those of us who have 
worked on it is more than that. Levinas gets what Shakespeare is 
doing. And he gets it because what Shakespeare is doing is what 
he himself is doing in philosophy, which is to say, studying human 
relations and human subjectivity in all of its complexity and infinite 
variety. That may sound like a commonplace, but it’s not. Shake-
speare and Levinas are working at two different ends of the same 
theoretical spectrum: namely, constituting a meditation on “the 
whole of philosophy.” “There are more things in heaven and earth, 
 Horatio,  /  than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (H 1.5.167-168) 
Hamlet remarks to his classmate, and we have to understand by 
that remark a reference at once to learning in general (beyond the 
confines of the study halls they may have attended at Wittenberg 
where theology and philosophy were discussed) and to the human 
capacity to think such thoughts in context of the full range of are-
nas in which ethical concerns for others (via faces, ghosts, and the 
responsibilities they command) come to the fore.
* * *
There is another more practical reason. The book has something 
of a fortuitous genesis. In 2014, I (Sandor) was invited by Kent 
Lehnhof to submit a paper to a projected volume on Levinas and 
Shakespeare which I did (it remains substantially the one produced 
below). The volume was assembled and submitted to a press in the 
spring of 2015 and when the press returned it (for reasons perhaps 
related to the fact that it would close its doors less than a year later), 
Kent graciously offered the project to any of us willing to pursue it. 
Since I myself was well into the planning of a conference on Levi-
nas at Purdue (a meeting of the North American Levinas Society 
in July of 2015) in which Ann Astell and Steven Shankman (who 
had written about both writers) were participants, and since I knew 
that Moshe Gold and Donald Wehrs were among the contributors 
Lehnhof had invited for his project, I saw an oportunity. I invited 
Ann Astell, Moshe Gold and Don Wehrs to deliver papers in a 
session on Shakespeare and Levinas that I moderated (and to which 
Steven Shankman responded) and the five of us—Astell, Shankman, 
Gold, Wehrs, and I—met for lunch at Hillel afterwards.
The current volume was born of that communion. We decided 
we would add papers of Astell and Shankman to the list of contrib-
utors to the volume among others (Richard Cohen’s essay, that had 
pioneered philosophic thinking about the conjunction of the two 
writers, was also added), and that Gold and I would explore the 
potentials for the collection’s publication. The prospect of publish-
ing with Purdue University Press a volume involving at least two 
current or former Purdue faculty members seemed to me a natural 
(I remain a professor of English at Purdue and Ann Astell was a 
professor of English before moving to Notre Dame as a professor 
of theology). I approached Peter Froehlich and the rest, as they say, 
is history. Froehlich sent it out for review and when the letters that 
came back were positive, he decided to publish the volume and that 
it would be perfect for the book launch he was constructing. The 
book that follows is an extension of these efforts.
The serendipity of these circumstances seems telling. Whatever 
drew us individually as literary readers to the Levinas conference 
(and Levinas’s understanding of the ethical) is probably not unre-
lated to whatever drew Levinas to Shakespeare to begin with, and to 
the profound literary critical ethical reading with which the English 
Elizabethan writer was already deeply engaged. One aim of this 
book is to explore more fully that engagement.
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References to the following works by Levinas are cited parentheti-
cally, using the following abbreviations. References to other works 
by Levinas are treated individually.
AT  Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
BPW  Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T.  Peperzak, 
Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996).
BV  Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. 
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CPP  Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dor-
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EE  Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
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Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2005).
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NT  Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press,1994).
OB  Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981).
PN  Proper Names, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996).
RB  Is it Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. 
Edited by Jill Robbins, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001).
TA  Le Temps et l’Autre (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1979).
TI  Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969).
TO  Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1987).
TTI  The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology trans. 
Andre Orianne (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1995).
References to the following works by Shakespeare are cited paren-
thetically, using the following abbreviations. References to specific 
editions of Shakespeare’s works are treated individually.
AC Antony and Cleopatra





MA Much Ado About Nothing
MND A Midsummer Night’s Dream
MV The Merchant of Venice
P Pericles, Prince of Tyre
R2 Richard II
TAN Titus Andronicus
VA Venus and Adonis
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Introduction
Moshe Gold and Sandor Goodhart
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
—Shakespeare (MND 5.1.14-17).1
but whate’er I be,
Nor I nor any man that but man is
With nothing shall be pleased, till he be eased
With being nothing
—Shakespeare (R2 5.5.38-41)
Shakespearean tragedy is above all the contact of man 
and nothingness, of nothingness in its ambiguity [son 
équivoque], in its diabolical form . . . . Shakespeare is 
the fabricator of nothingness; he who gives to noth-
ingness the appearances of being
—Levinas (CC 174)2
“[I]t sometimes seems to me,” Emmanuel Levinas writes, in one of 
the first books he publishes after the war, “that the whole of philos-
ophy is only a meditation of Shakespeare” (TO 72).3 “The whole of 
philosophy.” For Levinas, that phrase includes, among other writers, 
Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger; but also, 
of course, the ancients—Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.  Levinas’s 
wording here is key. The entirety of philosophy for him is “a med-
itation of Shakespeare” (une méditation de Shakespeare), which 
is to say, not “about” Shakespeare but “of” Shakespeare, “from” 
Shakespeare, a part of Shakespeare’s subject matter, his work—his 
plays, his poems. As if, for all of our critical acumen, we remain 
already lodged entirely within Shakespeare’s writing, as figments of 
his dramas, of his thinking about us. 
What astounding humility! As if everything that I (Levinas) 
am attempting to do, my entire phenomenological project—the 
 reconstitution of European subjectivity on an ethical foundation—
were already within Shakespeare’s own philosophic reach. Have 
other philosophers thought the same? Is not Shakespeare cus-
tomarily relegated within philosophic writing—metaphysical and 
phenomenological alike—to the category of aesthetics, and from 
aesthetics, to dramatic literature and dramatic representation? Do 
other philosophers really think their own thoughts were already 
Shakespeare’s four hundred years ago?
What about literary critics—scholars or theoreticians of Shake-
speare, for example? Do they see Shakespeare as groundbreaking 
in the same way they see themselves (especially in the romantic 
era)? Or rather, in praise of Shakespeare’s iconoclasm and “infinite 
variety,” have they not ironically constructed an elaborate matrix of 
inclusions and exclusions effectively “sacrificing” the critical com-
mentary his writing offers us?4 The formal tradition of Shakespeare 
criticism, from Pope, Johnson, and Dryden, through Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, through Arnold, Bradley, Eliot, Leavis, Lewis, and 
countless others, seems largely to have ignored the possibility that 
Shakespeare’s writing is self-reflexive.5 Not challenging it, necessarily, 
but putting it aside in pursuit of other more legitimate ends. Formal 
and historical considerations have often superseded discussion of 
Shakespeare as a critical thinker. Even considerations gathered from 
psychoanalytic and, on occasion, religious studies are deemed per-
missible ahead of regarding Shakespeare as a bonafide commentator 
on his own writing so long as such considerations are couched in the 
appropriate cultural studies garb. Moral approaches as well remain 
acceptable only so long as they echo the approaches of Kantian 
and Hegelian philosophers who read in accord with the categorical 
imperative or the end of history and the birth of modern secularism.
The European humanist perspective, in short, the primacy of the 
subject of consciousness before objects of knowledge, would seem 
the order of the day in both literary and philosophic study. In that 
context, the idea that Shakespeare could be writing about us—about 
the dramas in which we continue to live and work—would seem, 
for the mainstream of critical thinking about Shakespeare (whether 
within philosophy or literary study), not a little outrageous.
What if, in following Levinas’s post-war model, we take a critical 
leap? Levinas distinguishes between the act of saying something and 
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its reproduction some moments later as something said, between 
le dire (the “to say” or “saying”) and le dit (the “said”).6 What if we 
read Levinas’s claim as a challenge addressed to philosophers and 
literary critics alike? Is the literary criticism of Shakespeare that we 
consider “ethical” to be regarded henceforth exclusively as a medita-
tion on what Shakespeare has already said, or can it be a meditation 
on what he continues so powerfully to say to us in our current cir-
cumstances? Books on Levinas and more general philosophical topics 
deriving from his work abound. Scholars have been able to identify 
at least seventy-nine English language book titles (or subtitles) with 
the words “Levinas and” or “and Levinas” followed (or preceded) by 
the name of another writer or academic field. It is at least surprising, 
given Shakespeare’s significant and positive influence on Levinas’s 
corpus, that no single volume has yet appeared on the import of his 
explicitly identified English literary predecessor upon the Jewish phil-
osophic thinker, or of these two writers upon each other.7 Although a 
handful of scholars have juxtaposed these authors in isolated essays, 
there exists as yet no monograph or collection devoted to pursuing the 
implications for philosophy, religious studies, and literary criticism of 
the intricate and manifold relationships between these two towering 
iconic figures of our Western intellectual tradition.8
One function of the current volume is to address that gap. But 
the omission is odd in other ways. Wider nets have been cast. One 
recent volume combines Shakespeare with discussion of Levinas 
and some fifteen other philosophic thinkers—“celebrated authors 
in Shakespeare studies and in continental philosophy” one notable 
publisher’s blurb proclaims, a book that successfully “brings the two 
fields into dialogue with each other.”9
One brief essay on Levinas and Shakespeare, however, does not 
a book-length volume make.10 Upon the heels of the quadricen-
tennial anniversary of Shakespeare’s death, perhaps the ghost of 
one of Europe’s most revered literary writers can startle us from 
our familiar competencies, our literary and critical complacencies, 
and confront us with the obligations and responsibilities of a new 
ethical criticism. Perhaps it is time for us, with Levinas, to say of 
Shakespeare what Hamlet says of the ghost Shakespeare may himself 
have once played on the Elizabethan stage, “O my prophetic soul!” 
and “Meet it is I set it down” (H 1.5.41, H 1.5.108).
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In seeking to foster an ongoing dialogue between Shakespeare and 
Levinas, the contributors to the current collection remain acutely 
aware of the risks involved in their enterprise: the temptation to 
repeat familiar readings of one or another writer rather than engage 
their thought directly, the danger of reducing nuanced complexities 
to a few aphorisms or paraphrases, the pitfalls of failing to know 
enough scholarship within multiple fields of inquiry.
And then there are the risks associated with the genre of criticism 
itself. Rather than attempt to apply some kind of “Levinasian” liter-
ary critical methodology to Shakespeare, or concomitantly endeavor 
to affirm that Shakespeare has already engaged all that Levinas 
would later discover in his philosophic or religious studies writing, 
the writers in the current collection place Levinas and Shakespeare 
side by side in asymptotic relationships with each other. For all their 
different emphases, these essays collectively suggest that the proxim-
ity of one author to the other exposes respectively the discourses of 
philosophy, literary studies, and religious studies (by which we have 
traditionally understood them) to their deepest ethical dimensions 
in ways that are both inspiring and precarious, ways that if pursued 
more deeply or more distantly could turn out to have tragic and 
comic potentials of their own. Indeed, the care shown in this volume 
to both Shakespeare’s works and those of Levinas demonstrates the 
potential for vibrant new scholarship to rethink in its entirety the 
generic relation of tragedy to comedy.
The collection includes three previously published essays and 
nine essays written specifically for this volume by a range of schol-
ars, each of which sheds new light on the intriguing interrelation 
of Shakespeare to Levinas and Levinas to Shakespeare. Some of 
these essays discuss Levinas’s ideas in order to rethink early modern 
genre theory. Others read Levinas to open up previously unexplored 
aspects of individual plays. Still others contend that bringing to bear 
upon Shakespearean and Levinasian scholarship the largely unac-
knowledged discourse of religious studies intensifies and enriches 
any venture into ethical criticism. All promise to deepen our under-
standing of Shakespeare while demonstrating at the same time how 
fruitful Levinas’s ideas can be in the study of literature.
Levinas can, for example, give us a better sense of what is at stake 
in Shakespearean drama and can supply us with a rich vocabulary 
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and sophisticated theoretical framework for describing its operation 
and effects. Concomitantly, Shakespeare’s art can do much to clarify 
the radical quality of Levinas’s philosophic thought. Unlike more 
domesticated versions of ethical criticism, Levinas’s writing does 
more than merely urge us in the direction of tolerance or accep-
tance: it challenges and rebuilds the very framework of subjectivity 
from which such ethical claims proceed. Similarly, Shakespeare’s 
plays and poetry, focusing as such writing often does upon the 
necessity and difficulty of responding to the demands of another 
person in comic, tragic, historical, and romantic contexts, gains clar-
ity from Levinas’s untangling of our infinite responsibility for the 
other individual, for the other person or neighbor standing there 
alongside of me, as opposed to the abstract idea of the other we com-
monly invoke. The arresting singularity of Shakespeare’s humanized 
characters, the vivid particularity of his humanly imagined worlds, 
constitutes technical innovations whose aesthetic virtuosity is ener-
gized by its ethical urgency.
Nor do the essayists in this collection shy away from the glar-
ing and familiar problem of introducing Levinas in context of the 
discussion of any work of literature. On the one hand, it is a com-
monplace of Levinas studies that Levinas distrusted art as an escape 
or evasion. Inasmuch as art provides us with selfish pleasures and 
enables our escape from the real world, it offers us a kind of false 
transcendence. In this respect, art remains but an idol: a lifeless 
object put in place of the living Other. On the other hand, Levinas 
readily admitted his philosophical debts to specific authors and 
referred often to their literary works in his own writings (Shake-
speare being for him among the most prominent). The best authors, 
for Levinas, not only recognize and resist art’s idolatrous potential 
but also wrestle with the core philosophical and religious questions 
that it raises. If we take seriously a question Levinas asks—“is not 
reading a way of inhabiting? The volume of the book as a form of 
living space!”—then inhabiting the living spaces of Shakespeare 
and Levinas can contribute to contemporary debates concerning 
art’s ability (or inability) to show us the way out of Being, engaging 
us in the difficulties of freeing ourselves from the ontological con-
straints in which we all of necessity reside (BV 128). Reading and 
performing great art together in the company of profound ethical 
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criticism and philosophic writing—might not such an “inhabiting” 
form a kind of ethical discourse that continually interrupts itself 
and calls itself into question? Shakespeare’s art, it would seem, 
does as much in spades. His works continue to surprise, bewilder, 
and evade us, compelling us to make a response, and then examine 
that response in advance.
What about scriptural writing, which is often the mainstay of 
Levinas’s religious studies subject matter? The bringing together 
of the ethical and the literary also brings the literary into dialogue 
with religious concerns and so in scholarship with religious studies. 
Not surprisingly, Levinas insists that the task of the commenta-
tor on scripture and writing about scripture is not to solve, settle, 
or decipher the text but to renew it. The “life of the Talmudist,” 
Levinas writes, “is nothing but the permanent renewal of the letter 
through the intelligence” (NT 79). Taking this comment beyond 
the Talmud to apply to literary writing at large and Shakespeare’s 
writing in particular, this volume claims that no amount of erudition, 
historical contextualization, or critical knowledge of Shakespeare 
can substitute for the unceasing work of asking questions of the 
text (and listening to the questions the text poses to us). Anything 
but its incessant questioning threatens to turn the text into a dead 
letter, an academic artifact containing obscurities of no interest to 
students, scholars, or any other popular or high brow readers.
In the present collection, then, we turn to these two great writers 
in an attempt to bring some measure of “renewal” to Shakespeare’s 
and Levinas’s works through our approach to them. It is our hope 
that the essays contained herein perform the kind of responsible 
questioning that ought to provoke a new and viable ethical criticism, 
a critical writing that engages at the deepest level what it means 
to be a subject for whom ethical considerations are a part of the 
very air one breathes. As a volume with interests in philosophy, 
religious studies, and literary criticism, among other fields, it should 
be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in various 
areas of modern philosophy and contemporary religious thought, as 
well as those engaged in Shakespeare and Early Modern Studies, 
and, more generally, in literary criticism and theory. The collection 
endeavors to offer seasoned experts across the disciplines it engages 
fresh and compelling arguments while offering beginning graduate 
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students and advanced undergraduates accessible orientation to 
scholarly study of Levinas, Shakespeare, and the issues their implied 
dialogue opens up.
* * *
In “A Meditation,” which was originally titled “Some Reflections on 
Levinas on Shakespeare,”  Richard A. Cohen opens the door to the 
discussion we would follow in this collection. Examining carefully 
what appears to be every known reference in Levinas to Shakespeare 
in the published works of the philosopher, Cohen makes the case in 
full for the centrality of Shakespeare to Levinas’s critical project. As 
such, his essay remains a tribute to the richness of both writers, and 
we have duly chosen to reproduce his contribution as the rightful 
progenitor of this field of joint inquiry, a tribute echoed in numerous 
essays within this collection.
Within the essay, Cohen begins by unpacking Levinas’s declaration 
(cited above) “that the whole of philosophy is but a meditation of 
Shakespeare.” Noting the philosopher’s striking use of the possessive 
“of” in relating philosophy to Shakespeare, the author argues that this 
phrasing suggests “not that all of philosophy is a meditation about 
Shakespeare . . . but rather that the whole of philosophy is a meditation 
by Shakespeare, Shakespeare’s meditation,” Shakespeare meditating on 
philosophy.11 Cohen explores the degree to which Shakespeare’s world 
reverberates with various forms of moral exigency, religious rigor, the 
call to justice, and the demands of other great literature. Attending to 
“the elevating exigencies of an ethical metaphysics [that] find their full 
expression in a Shakespeare as they can find their proper articulation in 
all the world’s great literatures,” Cohen surmises that Shakespeare dra-
matizes what Levinas would recognize as human worlds with human 
characters driven to the heights of justice and morality. The Bard in 
this reading is not a moralist with flavorful maxims to distribute, but 
rather, his writings give “testimony to the Infinite” (EI 116). As such, 
Cohen’s clear survey of Levinas on Shakespeare has indeed offered 
many readers a way into the rigors of ethical exegesis.
But since the publication of Cohen’s essay in 2001, Levinas’s prison 
notebooks have been found and published. These are writings he 
composed while imprisoned during the Second World War. These 
notebooks reveal a striking correlation with both the  philosopher’s 
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earlier ideas (written in the thirties) and his later ideas as expressed 
in Existence and Existents, Time and the Other, and other texts. This 
correlation is especially evident in his comments about Shakespeare 
and in particular the tragedies. Here for example is a sample of his 
comments about Shakespeare as the “fabricator of nothingness”:
Shakespearean tragedy is above all the contact of man and noth-
ingness, of nothingness in its ambiguity [son équivoque], in its 
diabolical form. Lie (King Lear, Othello), the ambiguity [équiv-
oque] of the witches (Macbeth), the ghost (Hamlet). And from 
it derives the essential role in most Shakespearean tragedies of 
the liar and the traitor. Shakespeare is the fabricator of noth-
ingness; he who gives to nothingness the appearances of being.
The character Hamlet is particularly profound [in this regard], 
for there man has pierced ambiguity or rather he has made 
of this ambiguity the very theme of suffering. Hamlet is the 
reflection upon Shakespearean tragedy itself. He suffers from 
the insinuation of nothingness within being or of being within 
nothingness. To be or not to be—everything is there.
I take up again the theme of death: the fact that death equals 
the loss of the capacity to play shows that death is not as strong 
as being. Even if it concludes being, it does not exhaust all 
that being has done. Therefore, even within the hypothesis of 
Macbeth, it is neither an end nor within . . . .
Macbeth too, like Hamlet, is frightened by the fact that death 
perhaps does not exist—that it resolves nothing. His fright in 
seeing Banquo is in this sense the culminating point of the trag-
edy. It is starting from this moment moreover that he is without 
fear in the crime and that these scruples against which Lady 
Macbeth had fought no longer exist for him. Why? Despair 
(CC 174, 195-196).12
As Richard Cohen argued before the prison notebooks were pub-
lished, and as Howard Caygill remarked more recently upon the 
publication of the Carnets material, these writings are invaluable for 
acknowledging and responding to “the importance of Shakespeare 
for Levinas’s philosophizing.”13
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Cohen’s essay is followed here by three essays on one of the trag-
edies, King Lear. In “Lear’s ‘Darker Purpose’,” Sandor Goodhart 
takes a distinctly counter-redemptive view. He suggests that the 
play stages what might be characterized, echoing the king’s own 
language, as Lear’s “darker purpose.” “No rescue? What, a pris-
oner?” (4.6.191) Lear exclaims at one point, when he awakens on 
the heath, a sick, frail, and dying old man in the long central storm 
scenes, as if the whole maneuver of dividing up the kingdom has 
been explicitly undertaken in the expectation of a fairy-tale end-
ing, the kind of happy conclusion or “promised end” that indeed 
the story on which the play is based encouraged. In Shakespeare’s 
assessment of the world, Goodhart argues, Lear dies holding his 
dead daughter Cordelia in his arms, a lurid testimony only to his 
inability to distinguish a live human being from a deceased one (“I 
know when one is dead, and when one lives,” he says (5.3.261)), 
projective fantasies from real human relations. Levinas clarifies in 
Goodhart’s view the perspective that Lear fails to read (lire, in 
French), and which constitutes one of the sources of his delirium: 
namely, infinite responsibility for the other individual, the other 
human being, the neighbor.
Ann Astell offers a second essay on Lear. After highlighting their 
mutual interest in Shakespearean drama, Bible, and law, Astell 
imagines Levinas and theorist René Girard as “Readers of King 
Lear.” She speculates that Levinas would foreground the bonds 
of filial and parental piety that establish “vertical” relationships 
between characters, whereas Girard would focus on the “horizon-
tal” relationships of sibling rivalry. These complementary critical 
axiologies meet, in Astell’s analysis, at the play’s center, in the 
violence of the storm on the heath, where Girard’s scapegoated 
outcast encounters Levinas’s needy orphan. This encounter, in turn, 
serves to transform the disguised Edgar into an apocalyptic figure 
whose self-revelation at the play’s conclusion renews the revelation 
of commandment itself.
In a third essay on Lear, “Theology, Phenomenology, and the 
Divine in King Lear,” Kent R. Lehnhof observes that Cordelia fig-
ures into Shakespeare’s King Lear much as l’autrui figures into 
Levinas’s philosophy. The one who overawes, obsesses, and afflicts 
Lear, Cordelia is also in his view the one who summons and solicits 
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him from “beyond being.” She “disincarnates” the divine in the 
play in a non-systematic and non-thematizable way. This is not 
to say, in his view, that Lear is finally and simply a Levinasian 
fable of some kind. Rather, it is to suggest that Shakespeare was as 
invested in interpersonal relationships as was Levinas and appears 
to have entertained some similar ideas about them, including the 
idea that transcendence is not an effect of ecstasy or apotheosis 
but of interrelation.
In “Investment, Return, Alterity, and The Merchant of Venice,” 
Geoffrey Baker uses the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, in par-
ticular the overlooked leitmotif of circulation, in order to re-assess 
the location of social critique in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of 
Venice. Levinas’s understanding of circulation and giving can be 
understood, respectively, as forms of return and non-return. Read 
in this way, The Merchant of Venice produces and negotiates several 
key binaries, familiar to even more traditional readings of the play, 
as effects of circulation or giving, including Judaism and Christianity, 
justice and mercy, outbound and homeward journeys, investments 
returned and investments lost, taking and giving. A Levinas-based 
reading of these structures and their prominent role in Shakespeare’s 
play demonstrates to what great extent they are all interwoven and 
invested in each other, and in what manner rampant venture cap-
ital, simultaneously the pride and fall of Venice, is implicated at 
every step. Focused as Baker is upon the structures of meaning 
that enable and limit ethical relations in The Merchant of Venice, 
Shakespeare in his view emerges as a social critic more interested in 
interrogating the epistemological foundations than the mere social 
forces of economic relations.
In their jointly authored paper, “Traces, Faces, and Ghosts,” 
Hilaire Kallendorf and Claire Katz approach the relationship 
between Levinas and Shakespeare by examining an under theo-
rized theme—the role of the ghost in the works of both authors. 
In his 1946/7 lecture course, Time and the Other, Levinas forges 
both explicit and implicit connections among several of his central 
themes—the trace, the face, alterity, the ethical—connecting these 
themes to the ghost through his reference to a “visitation.” This essay 
examines the relationship between the face and the trace, using the 
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ghostly apparition, especially in Macbeth, as a way to connect these 
tropes in Levinas’s work.
In “From Horror to Solitude to Maternity,” Steven Shankman 
reflects upon the way Shakespeare figures in Levinas’s philosoph-
ical development from the time of the appearance of Existence 
and Existents and Time and Other, both published just after the 
Second World War, through Humanism of the Other and Other-
wise than Being in the early 1970s; and secondly, he considers how 
Levinas’s thought can, in turn, open up the ethical dimension of 
Macbeth, Hamlet, and King Lear, three plays that Levinas partic-
ularly admired. His essay thus places Shakespeare’s three greatest 
tragedies (Macbeth, Hamlet, and Lear) in the context of Levinas’s 
developing ideas as a philosopher, and it suggests how, if we read 
these plays with Levinas’s thought in mind, we can see in them as 
yet unrevealed ethical depths.
In “The Frustration of Desire and the Weakness of Power in 
Venus and Adonis,” Sean Lawrence brings Levinas’s critique of 
representation and his description of the erotic relationship to bear 
on “Venus and Adonis,” one of Shakespeare’s little-studied narrative 
poems. The recalcitrance of the Other to power explains not only 
why Venus fails to win the love of Adonis, but also why she must 
fail, inevitably. Where recent critics have tended to understand most 
relations as relations of power, a Levinasian reading allows us to see 
how Shakespeare dramatizes the failure of power in the frustration 
of Venus’s desire.
In “Ethical Ambiguity of the Maternal in Shakespeare’s First 
Romances,” Donald Wehrs argues that within Shakespeare’s England, 
the propensity of social affection to emerge from and resolve itself 
back into self-centered concerns was identified with  original sin, 
but his romances challenge philosophical and theological accounts 
of self-love’s primacy.  Pericles and Cymbeline delineate how the 
opening of the body to affect opens patriarchal cultural orders to 
the corrective authority of feminine voices (both actual women 
and maternal nature) and the soul to the regenerative effects of 
forgiveness. What Shakespeare dramatizes resembles and may be 
illuminated by Levinas’s analogous tracing of how felt experience 
of the ethical enables the self to recover, in a romance-like way, 
vital, redemptive parts of itself that, like daughters and wives in 
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Shakespearean romance, tend to be occluded, lost, or forfeited, but 
may, wondrously, be reclaimed and affirmed.
In “Culinary Skepticism in As You Like It and Montaigne’s ‘Of 
Experience’,” David B. Goldstein argues that both Michel de Mon-
taigne and Shakespeare anticipate Emmanuel Levinas’s argument 
that eating forms a material basis for skeptical inquiry. Shakespeare’s 
As You Like It uses eating as a tool to explore and articulate skeptical 
approaches to knowledge. Its approach mirrors that of Montaigne’s 
own brand of culinary skepticism, expressed most clearly in the last 
of his Essais, “Of Experience,” which documents human materiality 
(especially through practices of eating and defecating, since these 
actions expose us at our most material), in order to resist the ide-
ology of abstract perfection that Montaigne and Shakespeare both 
find so societally destructive. In one context, we find a skeptical and 
anti-ethical phenomenon, in which eating is a form of devourment, 
an exercise of power, a skeptical tearing apart of boundaries. In 
another context, eating functions commensally and performatively, 
helping to form ethically stable communities.
Finally, in “Staging Humanity in As You Like It and Pirkei Avot,” 
Moshe Gold stages a reading and thinking together of Levinas 
and Shakespeare’s comedy by way of the transmission of commen-
taries in Rabbinic thought on a specific Mishnah in Pirkei Avot, 
one that catalogues distinct educational life stages. Rethinking the 
dramatic, and pedagogical, encounters between Jaques and Rosa-
lind, on the one hand, and the Seven Ages speech and a Rabbinic 
staging of ages on the other, Gold argues that to better understand 
the ramifications of a Levinasian Other as a teacher, we might 
constructively consult what Levinas himself wrote in a note from 
1946: “My philosophy—is a philosophy of the face-to-face. Relation 
to the other, without intermediary. It is that of Judaism.”14 Blowing 
on the coals of Rabbinic traditions that transmit commentaries 
on one’s ethical/educational development, Gold helps Shakespear-
eans and Levinasians better understand how Shakespeare stages 
and performs ethical behavior via particular responses to Jaques’s 
pessimistic and static Seven Ages speech. In so doing, he argues 
for a revision of critical methodology to move beyond thematic 
religious explorations of a Shakespearean text to include Jewish 
thought as challenging standard receptions of the play, Shakespeare 
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studies, and Levinasian philosophy. In this manner, Gold commem-
orates a Jewish sermon given on the Tercentenary of the death of 
Shakespeare in which the speaker, talking about “Shakespeare and 
Rabbinic Thought,” refers to the great playwright as, among other 
designations, “a teacher of ethics.”15
* * *
The essays that follow are far from the only essays that could have 
been written to engage Levinas with Shakespeare and Shakespeare 
with Levinas. But our hope remains that they will offer a first step, 
a gateway to a future encounter between two powerful writers and 
critical thinkers that will endure and prove beneficial for all con-
cerned, an opening into which other authors will engage other plays 
or poems or philosophic tracts and thereby pursue other avenues 
along which critical thinking and the ethical will find themselves 
irretrievably entangled.
Notes
1 William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 5.1 See Stephen Green-
blatt, ed. The Norton Shakespeare (2008).
2 “La tragédie shakespearienne est avant tout le contact de l’homme et du néant, 
du néant dans son équivoque, dans sa forme diabolique . . . . Il [Shakespeare] est 
le fabricant du néant. Celui qui donne au néant les apparences de l’être.” See 
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Hamlet est particulièrement profond, car là l’homme a percé l’équivoque ou plutôt il 
a fait de cette équivoque le thème même de la souffrance. Hamlet c’est la réflexion 
sur la tragédie shakespearienne. Il souffre de l’insinuation du néant dans l’être ou 
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both Caygill’s “Levinas’s Prison Notebooks” (35) and in Caygill’s “Levinas and 
Shakespeare” (149).
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